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Abstract
In a neoclassical growth model with public consumption, we show the following
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income. Also, it should tax capital income more heavily than labor income. In an
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A central question in public economics is how to collect tax revenue for public spending. The
typical views are against capital income taxation except in the initial period and in favor
of consumption taxation. On the one hand, the Ramsey tax system advocates a high tax
on initial capital stock (or on capital income in the initial period) and a zero tax on capital
income in future times; see, e.g., Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1994). The Ramsey results hinge on the assumption that the government commit-
ment is permanent. On the other hand, many studies argue that consumption taxes usually
dominate either wage taxes or uniform income taxes in welfare terms; see, e.g., Summers
(1981), Seidman (1984), Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), Pecorino (1993, 1994), Devereux
and Love (1994), Turnovsky (2000), and Davies, Zeng and Zhang (2000). However, in the
United States the capital income tax rate is higher than both the consumption tax rate and
the wage income tax rate;1 there are also sizable subsidies on investment.2 The substantial
gap between tax practice and tax theory motivates our present work on taxation.
In this paper, we use a neoclassical growth model and an extension for home production
to investigate optimal taxation for the ﬁnance of public consumption that is valued in indi-
viduals’ preferences. Unlike the Ramsey tax approach that typically focuses on the trade-oﬀ
between labor and capital income taxes, we also consider consumption taxes and subsidies
on net investment like Investment Tax Credits. The set of ﬁscal instruments in our model is
suﬃciently large such that the Pareto optimal allocation is achievable. The Pareto optimal
1There is no concensus on the eﬀective tax rates in the United States. For details of the diﬀerent views,
see Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux and Poterba (1983), Slemrod and Gordon (1988), Gomme, Kydland and Rupert
(2001) and Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod (2004).
2The subsidy rate can be inferred as the gap between statutory and eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e s .T h eU Ss t a t u t o r y
corporate income tax rate had been 49.5% up until the 1986 tax reform that cut it to 38.3% along with
the elimination of a 10% investment tax credit. According to Fullerton and Karayannis (1993), the eﬀective
tax rate that considers also investment allowances, including accelerated depreciation and tax credits, was
14.4% in 1980 and 24% in 1990. Thus, the gap was about 35 and 14 percentage points in 1980 and 1990,
respectively. On the top of this gap, there are also tax credits for R&D expenditure in the US corporate tax
system. Having all these combined, the overall subsidy rate may be as high as 30%-40%.
1allocation will be characterized by the social planner allocation. With public consumption
in the preferences, a key departure of the competitive equilibrium from the social planner
allocation is that, when individuals cannot eﬀectively provide public consumption, market
labor becomes less meaningful to them. Consequently, leisure is expected to be above its
ﬁrst-best level and correspondingly market labor is below its ﬁrst-best level, a key concern
in the selection of taxes in addition to the concern of publicly providing an ideal level of
public consumption.
We show that the Pareto optimal taxation possesses the following features in the neo-
classical growth model with public consumption in the preferences. First, the government
should tax leisure and private consumption at the same rate, by setting the consumption and
labor income tax rates opposite to each other. Second, it should subsidize net investment at
the same rate at which it taxes net capital income. Doing so not only removes investment
distortions of capital income taxation but also generates a positive amount of net tax revenue
that can be as high as over 10% of output. Third, the government should tax net capital
income more heavily than labor income to raise market labor and reduce leisure. Finally,
these tax and subsidy rates, though allowed to vary, should be constant over time to avoid
intertemporal distortions, except that the tax rate on capital income in the initial period
can diﬀer from its later values.
Thus, our Pareto taxation approach may allow the government to tax the stock of, or the
income from, the initial asset or wealth in the same way as the Ramsey taxation approach
does. This tax may be eﬃcient and contributes valuable tax revenue to the government as
in the Ramsey taxation literature, as long as the government can commit on its tax promise
permanently. As was well known in the literature, however, this permanent commitment is
generally not credible and causes time inconsistency. In this regard, Auerbach and Hines
(2002, P. 1407) point out “The time-varying nature of optimal capital taxation makes such a
policy time-inconsistent, in that whatever proﬁle of future taxes that is optimal as of year t
2would not be optimal as of year t+1, and optimizing governments might therefore be tempted
not to follow through on previously announced tax plans”. This, among other factors, may
help explain why in the real world tax systems diﬀer from the Ramsey tax system. For this
reason, we do not use the capital income tax or a capital levy in the initial period to ﬁnance
future government spending.
These tax rules survive the extension to include home production. The additional Pareto
optimal tax rule with home production is that the government should tax home investment
for home production at the same rate it taxes private market consumption so as to avoid
distorting private consumption of the market and home goods at the margin. The con-
sideration of the home sector may be highly relevant in comparing income taxation with
consumption taxation for several reasons. First of all, the home sector is sizable in terms of
output, capital stock, labor hours and investment as opposed to the market sector (see, e.g.,
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright, 1991; Greenwood and Hercowitz, 1991; Gomme, Kydland
and Rupert, 2001). Despite the existence of a large home sector, however, most studies
on optimal taxation ignore it and focus only on the market sector. The ones with home
production in their analysis of taxes include Lerner (1970), Boskin (1975), Sandmo (1990),
Piggott and Whalley (1996), and Kleven, Richter and Birth (2000). They have examined
various tax distortions and the optimal structure of tax systems in static models with home
production. Diﬀering from these studies, we focus on intertemporal optimal ﬁscal policy in
a dynamic model with leisure and home production, and reach diﬀerent results.3
Another reason to consider the home sector is that it is treated diﬀerently from the
market sector in the real world tax system. In the market sector, factor incomes are typically
taxed, and so are ﬁnal goods and services, while investment is either exempted from taxes or
3Kolm (2000) and Engstrom, Holmlund and Kolm (2001) use wage bargaining/search models with home
production to study the employment and welfare eﬀects of labor income taxes. McGrattan, Rogerson and
Wright (1997) investigate the eﬀects of changes in taxes on output, investment and other variables in a
dynamic model with home production. However, they do not consider optimal taxation.
3subsidized. In the home sector, by contrast, income taxation does not apply, while investment
in home production is usually taxed under consumption taxation. For example, investment
for home renovation and maintenance is taxed at the stage of purchasing material inputs, but
tax deductible if it is intended for commercial use. This asymmetric treatment of investment
in the tax system across the two sectors casts doubt on the conventional view that favors
consumption taxation over income taxation.
O u rs t u d yi sn o tt h eﬁrst one to challenge the conventional view that ranks consump-
tion taxation over income taxation in welfare terms. In Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull
(1996), capital income taxation may be better than consumption taxation because the for-
mer leads to less government transfers than does the latter in a political equilibrium.4 In
the present paper, we will focus on allocation eﬃciency alone, rather than redistributional
income transfers.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes optimal taxation in
the neoclassical model with public consumption in the preferences. Section 3 extends the
analysis by considering the home sector. Section 4 concludes.
2. The neoclassical model with public consumption
Consider a production economy inhabited by many identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers with
a unit mass. In each period t =0 ,1,..., there are two goods: labor and a consumption-capital
good. A constant-return-to-scale technology is available to transform labor Lt and capital
Kt into output via the production function F(Kt,L t).5 The output can be used for private
consumption Ct,g o v e r n m e n tc o n s u m p t i o nGt, and new capital Kt+1. We shall assume that
4Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 97) identify upper limits on tax rates, revenue constraints, pure proﬁts
arising from productive government spending, or inclusion of capital in the social planner’s (not households’)
preferences as reasons for income taxes to persist in the long run. Aiyagari (1995) shows that incomplete
markets and borrowing constraints can produce the same result.
5We abstract from any external spillover from average or aggregate capital that may call for government
subsidies on investment as shown in Devarajan, Xie and Zou (1998).
4government consumption is a public good valued in individuals’ preferences, and is thus
endogenously determined in order to maximize social welfare. Feasibility in the economy
requires that
Ct + Gt + Kt+1 = F(Kt,L t)+( 1− δ)Kt, (1)





tU(Ct,L t,G t), 0 < β < 1, (2)
where β is the discount factor and the period-utility function U is increasing in private
and public consumption, decreasing in labor and strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
We assume that the government ﬁnances public consumption by using proportional taxes
on private consumption and on incomes from labor and capital net of depreciation, denoted
by τc,t, τw,t and τk,t, respectively. In addition, the government can subsidize private net
investment Kt+1 − Kt at a ﬂat rate sk,t, like investment tax credits that apply to new
investment but exclude replacement for depreciated capital.
This model is the deterministic version of Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), with
several extensions such as public consumption in the preferences, the consumption tax and
the investment subsidy. Since the government budget may not balance for any optimal tax
policy in some periods of the transition, we will allow government debt to even out such
possible imbalances over time.6 We denote government debt per consumer as Bt with an
after-tax return factor Rb,t.
The consumer budget constraint is (1 + τc,t)Ct + It − sk,t(Kt+1 − Kt)+Bt+1 = Rb,tBt +
rtKt−τk,t(rt−δ)Kt+(1−τw,t)wtLt where It = Kt+1−(1−δ)Kt is investment and rt and wt are
6However, we will not explore how an exogenous change in the scale of government debt serviced by
distortionary taxes can aﬀect the economy in this paper, which has been a subject by itself in the literature
(e.g. Burbidge, 1983).
5the before-tax rental rate of capital and the wage rate, respectively. The subsidy sk applies
to net investment Kt+1 − Kt,w h i l et h et a xτk applies to net capital income (rt − δ)Kt.
Note that capital depreciation is not taxed in this model as in the literature. Nor is the
replacement of depreciated capital subsidized. In this way of subsidization, all investment
in the process of building up any particular level of capital Kt is subsidized once and only
once.
Consumer purchases of capital are constrained to be nonnegative. We denote Rk,t ≡
1 − sk,t +( 1− τk,t)rt − δ(1 − τk,t) and rewrite the consumer budget constraint as
(1 + τc,t)Ct +( 1− sk,t)Kt+1 + Bt+1 = Rb,tBt + Rk,tKt +( 1− τw,t)wtLt. (3)
Note that Rk,t+1/(1−sk,t)=[ 1−sk,t+1+(1−τk,t+1)rt+1−δ(1−τk,t+1)]/(1−sk,t) corresponds
to the gross rate of return on investment in period t. One may regard the case τk,t = sk,t as
one that has a zero net tax on capital income. However, it will become clear later that the
net tax revenue with τk,t = sk,t can be positive when the capital income tax base is greater
than the investment subsidy base. Competitive pricing ensures that the before-tax returns
on capital and labor equal their marginal products, that is
rt = Fk(Kt,L t), (4)
wt = Fl(Kt,L t). (5)
The government budget constraint is given as
Bt+1 = Rb,tBt + Gt + sk,t(Kt+1 − Kt) − τc,tCt − τw,twtLt − τk,t(rt − δ)Kt. (6)
Without uncertainty in the model, the sole purpose of government debt is to oﬀset gov-
ernment deﬁcits and surpluses over time in the transition such that it is possible for the
government to set time invariant tax or subsidy rates. In the long run, the level of gov-
ernment debt can be set arbitrarily close to zero to concentrate on the ﬁnance of public
consumption rather than the repayment of government debt.
6In the rest of this section, we shall ﬁrst determine the Pareto optimal allocation by
investigating the social planner problem. We shall then investigate the tax and subsidy
rates that can decentralize the Pareto optimal allocation into a competitive equilibrium
allocation.
2.1. The social planner problem
The social planner problem is to maximize (2) subject to (1) by choosing the sequence
(Ct,L t,K t+1,G t), given the technology F(Kt,L t) and initial capital stock K0.T h e ﬁrst-
order conditions are given below for t ≥ 0.





Gt : Uc(t)=Ug(t), (9)
where Fl(t) ≡ Fl(Kt,L t)a n dFk(t) ≡ Fk(Kt,L t), referring to the marginal products of
labor and capital respectively; similarly, Uj(t) is the marginal utility with respect to variable
j = Ct,L t,G t. When time approaches inﬁnity, the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞λtKt =0 , (10)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint.
The system of equations (1), (7), (8) and (9) maps K into next K  and determines
(C(K),L(K),G(K)) implicitly in a recursive structure, along with the transversality condi-
tion (10). Starting with any K0 > 0, repeating this process over time can therefore implicitly
determine the solution for the sequence (Ct,K t+1,L t,G t).
72.2. The competitive equilibrium and government policy
In the decentralized economy, each consumer maximizes (2) subject to (3) by choosing a se-
quence (Ct,K t+1,L t)t a k i n gi n i t i a lK0 and government policy (τc,t,τk,t,τw,t,s k,t,G t)a sg i v e n .
Let pt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer budget constraint (3). The consumer





tU(Ct,L t,G t)+pt[Rb,tBt + RtKt +( 1− τw,t)wtLt − (1 + τc,t)Ct −
(1 − sk,t)Kt+1 − Bt+1]}. (11)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for t ≥ 0a r e
Bt+1 : Bt+1[pt − pt+1Rb,t+1]=0 , (12)
Kt+1 : Kt+1[(1 − sk,t)pt − pt+1Rt+1]=0 , (13)
Ct : β
tUc(t)=pt(1 + τc,t), (14)
Lt : β
tUl(t)=−pt(1 − τw,t)wt. (15)
The two transversality conditions associated with Bt and Kt are
lim
t→∞ptBt =0 , (16)
lim
t→∞ptKt =0 . (17)
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with Bt+1 and Kt+1 imply the no-arbitrage condition
between these two variables:
Rb,t+1 = Rk,t+1/(1 − sk,t). (18)
The government chooses the level of public consumption Gt to maximize (2) subject
to its constraint (6). Note that substituting the government budget constraint (6) into the
8consumer budget constraint (3) results in the feasibility constraint (1). Thus, the government
chooses G i nt h es a m ew a ya st h es o c i a lp l a n n e rd o e s ,a n dt h e r e f o r eh a st h es a m eﬁrst-order
condition (9). In order to ﬁnance public consumption according to (6), the government
chooses the rates of the taxes and the subsidy such that the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
consumer problem are the same as those in the social planner problem.
The optimal government policy is given below.
Proposition 1: For t ≥ 0, the Pareto optimal government policy is characterized by 1 >
τw,t = −τc,t, 1 >s k,t = τk,t+1, Uc(t)=Ug(t) and Bt+1 =[ 1− δ + Fk(t)]Bt + Gt + sk,t(Kt+1 −
Kt)−τc,tCt −τw,tFl(t)Lt −τk,t(Fk(t)−δ)Kt.A l s o ,sk,t, τk,t+1, τc,t and τw,t are constant over
time for t ≥ 0. In particular, τw < τk for t>0 if B∞ ≥ 0.
Proof. First, it is obvious that the ﬁrst-order condition (9) with respect to Gt holds true
in both the social planner problem and the competitive equilibrium with the government
choosing public consumption. Second, from the ﬁrst-order conditions (14) and (15), we have
−Ul(t)/Uc(t)=( 1−τw,t)wt/(1+τc,t)=( 1−τw,t)Fl(t)/(1+τc,t). The relationship τc,t = −τw,t
removes the tax distortion from this optimal condition concerning the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ,
and makes it the same as (8) in the social planner problem.






Uc(t +1 ) .
Removing tax distortions from this intertemporal optimal condition involves two rules. One
is to set a time-invariant consumption tax rate, i.e. τc,t = τc,t+1 for 1 >s k,t and 1 > τk,t+1.
Since τc,t = −τw,t, the labor income tax rate must also be time invariant, i.e. τw,t = τw,t+1.
The other rule is to set sk,t = τk,t+1 and sk,t = sk,t+1 that leads to Rk,t+1/(1 − sk,t)=
1−δ+Fk(t+1)bynotingthatrt+1 = Fk(t+1)andRk,t+1 =1−sk,t+1+(1−τk,t+1)(rt+1−δ).
As a result, τk,t+1 should also be constant over time for t ≥ 0. Combining these two rules
9together makes the intertemporal optimal condition the same as (7) in the social planner
problem.
Fourth, substituting the government budget constraint (6) into the consumer budget
constraint (3) results in the feasibility constraint (1) as mentioned earlier. Also, this implies
that the multiplier pt in (11) should be the same as λt associated with feasibility in the social
planner problem. Therefore, the transversality conditions (10) and (17) are the same. In a
nutshell, the tax rules and the constraints result in the same system of four equations (1),
(7), (8) and (9) that implicitly determines the allocation solution in a recursive structure as
in the social planner problem, satisfying the same transversality condition.
Further, substituting Fl = w, Fk = r and Rb = Rk/(1 − sk)=1− δ + Fk into (6) gives
Bt+1 =[ 1−δ+Fk(t)]Bt+Gt+sk,t(Kt+1 −Kt)−τc,tCt−τw,tFl(t)Lt−τk,t(Fk(t)−δ)Kt.T h i s
imposes an additional restriction on the decentralization of the social planner allocation into
an equilibrium allocation through the tax policy, together with τw < 1a n dτk < 1. Since the
tax rates are constant over time, government debt will carry forward the remaining imbalance
in the government budget in the transition toward the long run. We will then focus on the
long-run restriction on government ﬁnancing below.
Finally, in order to establish τk > τw for t>0, let us deﬁne τ∆ = τk −τw using the result
that the tax rates and the subsidy rate are time invariant (except the initial tax rate τk,0).
Note also that in the steady state It = δKt with Bt+1 = Bt and Kt+1 = Kt. Substituting
τ∆ = τk − τw, sk = τk and τc = −τw and the steady-state conditions into (6) yields
Gt = −Bt(Fk(t) − δ) − τwCt + τwFl(t)Lt +( τw + τ∆)(Fk(t) − δ)Kt
= −Bt(Fk(t) − δ)+τw[F(Kt,L t) − Ct − δKt]+τ∆(Fk(t) − δ)Kt.





(Fk(t) − δ). (19)
10Because 1 − τw > 0 and because Fk(t) − δ > 0 for a meaningful problem for ﬁrms, we must
have τ∆ > 0 in the steady state in order to have positive public consumption if government
debt in the steady state is positive or zero (i.e. B∞ ≥ 0). That is, τk > τw in the steady
state as long as government debt is positive or zero. Since these tax rates are time invariant
outside the steady state as well with only one exception τk,0,w em u s th a v eτw < τk for t>0
as long as B∞ ≥ 0.
According to (19), there is a trade-oﬀ between G and B in the long run. To ﬁnance public
consumption, the government can set B∞ arbitrarily close to zero in the steady state. The
case −∞ <B ∞ < 0 is also possible when the government has built up an asset by a capital
levy in the initial period as in the Ramsey taxation models. In particular, the initial tax
on capital income in our model can be chosen to inﬂuence the time invariant tax rates such
that government debt in the long run is close to zero through the intertemporal government
budget constraint. As we explained earlier, we do not use the initial capital levy to be the
source of tax revenue to ﬁnance public consumption in the long run (i.e. ruling out B∞ < 0
by assumption).
Among the key features of the Pareto optimal government policy, the rule τc,t = −τw,t
means that private consumption and leisure should have the same tax rate. Otherwise, a
higher tax rate on private consumption than that on leisure would make consumption more
expensive and leisure less expensive, thereby encouraging consumers to spend more time on
leisure and less income on private consumption, and vise versa. The time invariant feature
of the consumption tax rate is necessary because taxing private consumption more or less at
one time than at another would engender intertemporal distortions concerning investment
at the margin. The rule sk,t = τk,t+1 means that the government should tax net capital
income and subsidize net investment at the same rate so as to avoid distorting the decision
on investment at the margin. The subsidy rate and the capital income tax rate should also
be constant over time to avoid intertemporal distortions, except that the capital income tax
11rate in the initial period is independent of this restriction.
In fact, in the Pareto optimal tax system the capital income tax rate in the initial period
τk,0 can be chosen to run a balanced government budget in that period. If the government
were to run a budget surplus then it would set a high initial capital income tax rate and
build up an asset for future government spending as in the Ramsey taxation literature that
typically ﬁnds a zero tax on capital income after a ﬁnite number of periods. Unlike the
Ramsey taxation calling for a zero tax on capital income in the long run, the Pareto optimal
taxation in our model can generate a positive amount of tax revenue from net capital income
minus subsidies on net investment in all periods. This is because the net capital income
tax base is usually greater than the net investment subsidy base. In the steady state, for
example, net investment Kt+1 − Kt is equal to zero in this neoclassical growth model and
hence the revenue from taxing net capital income less the investment subsidy is equal to
τk(Fk(t) − δ)Kt > 0 because Fk(t) − δ > 0 is necessary to cover a positive real interest rate
on the capital rental market.
The result that net capital income should be taxed more heavily than labor income after
the initial period (τk > τw) is consistent with the actual tax rate diﬀerential in the United
States but is at odds with the results in the Ramsey taxation literature. One reason for this
result arises from the fact that individual consumers cannot eﬀectively provide the amount
of public consumption without government provision. The government provision, on the
other hand, is regarded as external by individual consumers. As a consequence, the private
marginal rate of return on market labor to a consumer in the decentralized equilibrium is
lower than the social rate in the social planner problem, implying that equilibrium leisure
(labor) is above (below) its ﬁrst-best level. Thus, taxing capital income more heavily than
labor income is intended to tip the trade-oﬀ between labor and leisure toward the former.
Another reason for the result is our use of investment tax credits. Without the investment
subsidy as in the Ramsey tax literature, taxing capital income would reduce investment and
12hence become less attractive than taxing labor income in the long run.
The constancy of tax rates over time and the transitory nature of the capital income tax
rate in the initial period are similar to those in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) whereby
the capital income tax is roughly equal to zero after the initial transition period. However,
neither the tax on private consumption spending nor the subsidy on investment is allowed
in their model. In our model, setting the tax rate on consumption opposite to the tax rate
on labor income leads to an equal tax rate on private consumption and leisure. In addition,
setting an equal rate for the subsidy on net investment and for the tax on net capital income
cancels out the investment distortion of capital income taxation and contributes a positive
amount of net tax revenue at the same time. Furthermore, in our model as in Chari et
al. (1994), government debt can absorb government deﬁcits or surpluses so as to support
constant tax rates over time in the transition. In the long run, however, the government can
set the level of government debt arbitrarily close to zero so as to concentrate on the ﬁnance
of public consumption. This can be achieved by selecting the initial tax on capital income
and the Pareto optimal policy concerning the time invariant rates of taxes and subsidies. In
doing so, a higher initial tax on capital income means lower tax rates in future times when
targeting zero government debt in the long run.
It is also worth noting that the Pareto optimal taxation in our model permits a whole
range of possible tax and subsidy combinations, as long as the rules established in Proposition
1 are followed. A special case of the Pareto optimal tax system is to set τw = τc =0a n d
use τk = sk for t>0 alone. In the steady state, this exclusive capital income tax with the
subsidy at the same rate may contribute an amount of net tax revenue over 10% of output
for a large enough τk. In our model, the ratio of the capital income tax revenue to output
in the steady state is equal to τk(Fk(t) −δ)Kt/Yt > 0. If we use τk =7 0 % ,Kt/Yt =2 .9a n d
Fk −δ = 6% (the real annual interest rate), then the ratio of the capital income tax revenue
to output in the steady state is about 12%. In all periods including the transition, the ratio of
13the net capital income tax revenue to output is equal to τk[(Fk(t)−δ)Kt−(Kt+1−Kt)]/Yt =
τk[Fk(t)Kt − It]/Yt with sk = τk. If we set the capital income tax rate at τk = 70% and
consider realistic ﬁgures of the capital income share in output at Fk(t)Kt/Yt =3 5 %a n d
the investment output ratio at 18%, then the ratio of the net capital income tax revenue
to output is also about 12%.7 This accounts for over 40% of the ratio of total government
spending to GDP in the United States (28%). Obviously, if the preferences and technology
are such that the ideal level of public consumption can be ﬁnanced by the net capital income
tax revenue net of investment subsidies, then the Pareto optimal tax rules can decentralize
the social planner allocation into an equilibrium allocation.
If the ideal level of government spending exceeds the tax revenue from the Pareto optimal
tax system, then one may have to consider to reduce subsidies on investment and leisure or
increase taxes on private consumption spending and capital income. By Proposition 1 and
the proof of it, a consumption tax alone without a matching subsidy on labor can only be
a second best tax because it distorts the decision on private consumption and leisure at the
margin. An improvement upon such a pure consumption tax without subsidies on labor for
higher welfare may be achieved by adding a tax on net capital income with an investment
subsidy to some extent, in the spirit of Proposition 1.
Next, we consider home production.
3. The extended model with home production
In this section, we use a relatively standard macro model with home production that has
proved useful in a variety of other macro applications in, e.g., Greenwood and Hercowitz
(1991), Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright (1995), McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997),
Einarsson and Marquis (1997) and Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000).
7This ﬁgure 12% is consistent with the actual ratio of government consumption to GDP in the United
States in the 1994 version of the data set by Barro and Lee. Also, see Barro (1990).
14In this extended model, the home sector purchases an investment good Ih,t = Kh,t+1−(1−
δh)Kh,t from the market and uses home capital Kh,t and home labor Lh,t to produce a home
consumption good Ch,t = H(Kh,t,L h,t). The home-production technology H(Kh,t,L h,t)i s
also assumed to be homogenous of degree one, like the technology used in the market sector
that is now denoted as F(Km,t,L m,t) where the subscript m refers to the market sector. The
depreciation rate of home capital is δh ∈ (0,1) and the depreciation rate of market capital
is δm ∈ (0,1). Accordingly, Im,t = Km,t+1 − (1 − δm)Km,t.
Feasibility now requires that
Cm,t + Gt + Km,t+1 + Kh,t+1 = F(Km,t,L m,t)+( 1− δm)Km,t +( 1− δh)Kh,t. (20)




tU(Cm,t,C h,t,L t,G t), (21)
where Lt = Lm,t + Lh,t. The consumer budget constraint is given as
(1 + τc,t)Cm,t +( 1 + τh,t)[Kh,t+1 − (1 − δh)Kh,t]+( 1− sk,t)Km,t+1 + Bt+1
= Rb,tBt + Rk,tKm,t +( 1− τw,t)wtLm,t, (22)
where Rk,t ≡ 1−sk,t+(1−τk,t)(rt−δm) as in the previous section and τh,t is the tax rate on
the purchase of home investment from the market. It is possible that this tax rate is equal to
the tax rate on the purchase of private consumption Cm. It is interesting to explore whether
this possibility becomes a tax rule in the Pareto tax system because taxing home investment
may cause distortions on home and market activities. In particular, it may reduce home
investment and may in turn reduce home labor by reducing the marginal gain of home labor
(may therefore raise leisure and market labor). Here, rt = Fkm(t)a n dwt = Flm(t)a si nt h e
previous section. The government budget constraint is
Bt+1 = Rb,tBt + Gt + sk,t(Km,t+1 − Km,t) − τc,t Cm,t − τh,t[Kh,t+1 − (1 − δh)Kh,t]
15−τk,tKm,t(rt − δm) − τw,twt Lm,t. (23)
In the remainder of this section, we investigate the social planner problem ﬁrst and then
the competitive equilibrium with the government providing public consumption via various
taxes.
3.1. The social planner problem
The social planner maximizes (21) subject to (20) and Ch,t = H(Kh,t,L h,t). The optimal
conditions for t ≥ 0a r e
Km,t+1 : Ucm(t)=βUcm(t +1 ) [ 1− δm + Fkm(t +1 ) ] , (24)









Gt : Ucm(t)=Ug(t). (28)
Here, Hkh(t) ≡ Hkh(Kh,t,L h,t)a n dHlh(t) ≡ Hlh(Kh,t,L h,t), referring to the marginal prod-
ucts of home capital and home labor respectively. Among these conditions, (24), (26) and
(28) are similar to their counterparts in the previous section without home production. The
transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞λtKh,t =0 , (29)
lim
t→∞λtKm,t =0 . (30)
Again, the above equations determine the social planner allocation implicitly in a recursive
structure.
163.2. The competitive equilibrium and government policy
Each consumer maximizes (21) subject to the consumer budget constraint (22) and the home
production technology Ch,t = H(Kh,t,L h,t) by choosing a sequence of market and home activ-
ities (Cm,t,C h,t,K m,t+1,K h,t+1,L m,t,L h,t), taking initial stocks (Km,0,K h,0)a n dg o v e r n m e n t
policy (τc,t,τh,t,τw,t,τk,t,s k,t,G t) as given. Again, let pt be the Lagrange multiplier on the
consumer budget constraint. The optimal conditions are given below.
Bt+1 : Bt+1[pt − pt+1Rb,t+1]=0 , (31)








tUcm(t)=pt(1 + τc,t), (34)
Lm,t : β
tUl(t)=−pt(1 − τw,t)wt, (35)
Lh,t : Ul(t)=−Uch(t)Hlh(t). (36)
As in Section 2, the government chooses the level of public consumption Gt to maximize
social welfare (21) subject to the government budget constraint (23). Again, substituting
the government budget constraint (23) into the consumer budget constraint (22) leads to the
feasibility constraint (20). Thus, the ﬁrst-order condition of the government choosing Gt is
the same as (28) in the social planner problem. The transversality conditions are similar to
those given earlier. The no-arbitrage condition between investments in government bonds B
and in market capital Km i st h es a m ea st h a ti n( 1 8 ) .
The optimal government policy with home production is given below.
Proposition 2: For t ≥ 0, the Pareto optimal government policy with home production
is characterized by 1 > τw,t = −τc,t, τh,t = τc,t, 1 >s k,t = τk,t+1, Ucm(t)=Ug(t) and
17Bt+1 =[ 1−δm+Fkm(t)]Bt+Gt+sk,t(Km,t+1−Km,t)−τc,tCm,t−τh,t[Kh,t+1−(1−δh)Kh,t]−
τw,tFlm(t)Lm,t − τk,t(Fkm(t) − δm)Km,t.A l s o ,sk,t, τk,t+1, τc,t, τh,t and τw,t are constant over
time for t ≥ 0. In particular, τw < τk for t>0 if B∞ ≥ 0.
Proof. First, the ﬁrst-order condition (28) with respect to Gt in the social planner problem
is valid in the competitive equilibrium as mentioned earlier. Second, from the ﬁrst-order
conditions (34) and (35), we have −Ul(t)/Ucm(t)=( 1 −τw,t)wt/(1+τc,t)=( 1 −τw,t)Flm(t)/(1+
τc,t). The relationship τc,t = −τw,t removes the tax distortion from this optimal condition
and makes it the same as (26) in the social planner problem in the same way as in the proof
of Proposition 1.










Ucm(t +1 ) .
As in the proof of Proposition 1, removing tax distortions from this intertemporal optimal
condition requires τc,t = τc,t+1, sk,t = τk,t+1 and sk,t = sk,t+1 for 1 >s k,t and 1 > τk,t+1.
This leads to Rk,t+1/(1 − sk,t)=1− δ + Fkm(t +1 )b yn o t i n gt h a trt+1 = Fkm(t +1 )a n d
Rk,t+1 =1 −sk,t+1+(1−τk,t+1)(rt+1−δm). Since τc,t = −τw,t, the constancy of the consumption
tax over time means that the labor income tax rate must also be time invariant as well, i.e.
τw,t = τw,t+1 for t ≥ 0. Similarly, the relationship sk,t = τk,t+1 means that the constancy of
sk,t over time carries on to τk,t+1 for t ≥ 0 as well. Combining these arguments all together
leads to (24) in the social planner problem as we argued in the proof of Proposition 1.











Ucm(t + 1)(1 − δh)+Uch(t +1 ) Hkh(t +1 )

.
Setting τc,t = τh,t can make this condition the same as (25) in the social planner problem.
Since τc,t is constant over time, τh,t must be so as well. In addition, the ﬁrst-order condition
18with respect to home labor (36) is the same as (27) in the social planner problem, that
is there is no direct tax distortion in this optimal condition with respect to the trade-oﬀ
between leisure and home labor. As mentioned earlier, substituting the government budget
constraint (23) into the consumer budget constraint (22) leads to the feasibility constraint
(20). As argued in the proof of Proposition 1, this leads to the same multiplier in the
social planner problem and the competitive equilibrium and therefore leads to the same
transversality conditions governing the long-run behavior of capital stocks Kh,∞ and Km,∞.
Now, we get the same system of equations as those in the social planner problem to implicitly
determine the allocation solution in a recursive structure.
Finally, substituting Flm = w, Fkm = r and Rb = Rkm/(1 − sk)=( 1− δm + Fkm)i n t o
the government budget constraint (23) gives Bt+1 =[ 1−δm+Fkm(t)]Bt+Gt+sk,t(Km,t+1−
Km,t) − τc,tCm,t − τh,t[Kh,t+1 − (1 − δh)Kh,t] − τw,tFlm(t)Lm,t − τk,t(Fkm(t) − δm)Km,t.T h i s
imposes an addition restriction on the decentralization of the social planner allocation into
an equilibrium allocation through the tax policy, together with τw,t < 1a n dτk,t < 1. The
rest of the proof is similar to the counterpart in the proof of Proposition 1.
With home production, the Pareto optimal tax rules in Proposition 1 are still valid,
except that the government budget balance now includes a tax (or a subsidy if τh,t < 0) on
home-investment spending. The new ﬁndings with home production are as follows. The tax
(or subsidy) rate on home investment should be equal to the tax (or subsidy) rate on private
consumption spending; and it should be time invariant.
The intuitions for these new insights are as follows. The time invariant feature of this tax
on home investment spending avoids intertemporal distortions. Setting the tax rate on home
investment spending at the same rate as that on private consumption spending is somewhat
surprising, as the traditional view is typically against taxes on investment spending. It turns
out that a tax on home investment spending is essentially a tax on private consumption of
a non-market good despite home labor is also used in home production. Thus, equalizing
19the tax rates on the two private consumption goods helps to remove distortions between
them at the margin, as long as leisure is taxed at the same rate under τc = τh = −τw to
oﬀset the expected negative eﬀect of τc and τh on market labor and home labor, respectively.
Speciﬁcally, −Ul(t)/Ucm(t)=[ ( 1 − τw)/(1 + τc)]Flm(t)a n d−Ul(t)/Uch(t)=Hlh(t) under
τc = −τw imply a socially optimal trade-oﬀ Ucm(t)/Uch(t)=Hlh(t)/Flm(t). This optimal
trade-oﬀ means that the marginal rate of substitution between the two private consumption
goods should be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of labor between these two sectors.
Putting it diﬀerently, it means that the marginal utility of home labor Uch(t)Hlh(t) should be
equal to the marginal utility of market labor Ucm(t)Flm(t).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a neoclassical growth model and an extension for home production
to investigate optimal taxation. We have assumed public consumption in the preferences of
the population and allowed for a suﬃciently large set of ﬁscal instruments such that the
Pareto optimal allocation is achievable. We have found that the Pareto optimal taxation
should have the following features. First, the government should tax leisure and private
consumption at the same rate. Second, it should subsidize net investment at the same rate
at which it taxes net capital income. Doing so not only removes investment distortions
of capital income taxation but also generates a positive amount of net tax revenue that
c a nb ea sh i g ha so v e r1 0 %o fo u t p u t . T h i r d ,t he government should tax capital income
more heavily than labor income to raise market labor and reduce leisure, because otherwise
public consumption in individuals’s preferences would cause leisure to be above its ﬁrst-best
level. Fourth, all these tax rates and the subsidy rate should be constant over time to avoid
intertemporal distortions, with one exception that the capital income tax rate in the initial
period may diﬀer from its later values.
20These Pareto optimal tax rules are valid in the extended version of the neoclassical
growth model with home production. The additional insight with home production is that
t h eg o v e r n m e n ts h o u l dt a xh o m ei n v e s t m e n tf o rh o m ec o n s u m p t i o na tt h es a m er a t ea tw h i c h
it taxes private market consumption. Again, these tax rates should be constant over time to
avoid intertemporal distortions.
Since the Pareto optimal taxation faces an upper limit on the revenue it can generate
relative to output, it may not be possible to decentralize the social planner allocation into
an equilibrium allocation when the preference over public consumption is suﬃciently strong.
Interestingly, the attainable revenue as a fraction of output by the Pareto optimal taxation
may be consistent with the realistic ratio of government consumption to GDP in the United
States. A more complete analysis of optimal taxation that also considers other components
of government spending, such as welfare transfer payments, awaits future research.
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